Introduction
As the world ponders the beginning of a new century, the manner in which people communicate and gather information is evolving rapidly. Perhaps the most important tool in communicating and informing is the Internet, which was created nearly 20 years ago by researchers and educators who sought to share information. The Internet has become the mainstream "information public policy debates in the computer industry, the use of export control of cryptography is not a subject of universal agreement. In fact, government officials and the computer industry are engaged in the kind of conflict over cryptography policy that very well inhibits, instead of develops, the growth and strength of information protection.
With the ever-increasing use of electronic communications and data storage, the time superhighway" in the current Information Age, as an estimated 20 million people worldwide have turned to the Net to share
New computer technology has spawned
has come to design a public policy for the use of cryptography that adequately balances all the interests involved in the debate, including law enforcement, national security, global economic competitiveness, and individual privacy.
information, research a topic, look up an address, or even get a date. But all those who think that information posted on the Internet is confidential are in for a surprise. Electronic data storage and on-line communications have grown exponentially over the past decade. New computer technology has hacker with the right tools can invade systems that are designed to be impenetrable. As a result, nervous Internet users are demanding greater protection for their information.
Currently, the greatest single tool to ensure data security in cyberspace is cryptography, defined as the translation of ordinary text into a series of symbols that is indecipherable without the correct code. Regrettably, current cryptography export policy is not adequate to meet the demands of Internet users. Additionally, like so many GW Policy Perspectives 1997 spawned a digital revolution that has increased speed, efficiency, and savings for the communication and exchange of information. As a result, a wide variety of people are taking advantage of the new technology. Businesses use digital channels of communication for the exchange of sensitive information such as project proposals, corporate marketing strategies, research and development, bidding information, and even trade secrets. People may also use on-line communication to send letters and conduct financial transactions. Sensitive data such as medical records, driving records, and credit histories are stored in computer databases.
Inevitably, growth of information technology has attracted malicious mischief. The expansive growth of information technology has turned out to be a double-edged sword: as technology becomes more sophisticated, the ability of thieves to break into computer networks and databases and improperly gain access to information keeps pace. Vandals, hackers, organized crime, business competitors, and intelligence agencies of foreign governments have targeted business, government, and private communication for theft of records, trade secrets, passwords, and other critical information. However, this widespread threat of unauthorized access is unacknowledged by many. Americans seem to assume that their .privacy is protected amidst the growth of computer and communications technology.
Despite this general lack of acknowledgment of the possibility of trouble, the vulnerability of computer networks has not gone unnoticed. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO), in a 1993 report to Congress, pointed out that "Increased use of computer and communications networks, computer literacy, and dependence on information technology heighten U.S.
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industry's risk of losing proprietary information to economic espionage." 2 When the GAO was called upon by Congress to investigate the nature of the problem of economic espionage via computers, it found that "there was a growing problem for U.S. companies at home and abroad." 3 The FBI surveyed 400 companies and institutions in March of 1996 and found that over 40 percent reported break-ins, with 30 percent of these break-ins involving the Internet, despite the fact that these companies had in place a fire wall, a computer equipped with software that is supposed to only let legitimate traffic pass through. 4 Financial losses from computer crime has reached nearly $10 billion a year. 5 The GAO was unable in its study to determine the full extent of the problem because companies were reluctant to disclose the full extent of their vulnerability, fearing loss of shareholder confidence and the difficulty in placing a value on the proprietary data that was lost. 6 Private citizens should also be concerned about the vulnerability of information technology. As G.A.
Keyworth and David Colton wrote:
Americans take it for granted that when they send a package via first class mail its contents are protected. We do not worry that someone will open our envelopes and take our checking or credit card numbers, read our personal letters or steal our business ideas. Yet our privacy could be threatened as we move to a digital economy and more information is shared electronically. 7 Michael Froomkin also commented upon the vulnerability of private electronic mail messages by pointing out, lithe ease with which electronic mail messages can be intercepted by third parties means that communicating by public electronic mail systems, like the Internet, is becoming almost as insecure as talking in a crowded restaurant." 8 Even Internet companies are warning their own customers of the danger. Netscape Communications, Inc., the company that developed the popular Internet browser Netscape Navigator, acknowledges the potential threat to data being sent along the Internet. Any time a user of the browser attempts to send information such as e-mail, the following warning appears: II Any information you submit is insecure and could be observed by a third party while in transmit. If you are submitting passwords, credit card numbers or other information you would like to keep private, it would be safer to cancel the transmission." 9 Using Michael Froomkin's analogy of talking in the restaurant, not only is the restaurant crowded, but the patrons are increasingly interested in the conversation.
Cryptography
The most important tool in securing information technology and bringing about the security mechanisms of traditional paper-based communications media-envelopes and locked filing cabinets-is cryptography, which allows for a degree of protection for communications and information stored and transmitted by computers. 10 The Internet Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group, the entities responsible for setting the standards for the Internet, note that "Cryptography is the most powerful tool that users can use to secure the Internet." 11 Prior to the recent growth in information technology, cryptography technology was only critical to the federal government which used cryptography to secure sensitive State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence agency information.
Encryption involves the conversion of clear text into an unreadable form. Cryptographic technology involves two processes. The first process is the encryption process. Data is encoded or "scrambled" using an algorithm (mathematical procedure) and a randomly selected variable associated with the mathematic formula known as the "key." 12 Only the person who holds the key can conduct the second process, decryption. With decryption, the key interacts with the algorithm which brings the scrambled text back into readable form. Only the intended recipient of the data transmission, or someone legally entitled to access stored database information, can unscramble the information and gain access to the information.
The key consists of a string of numbers which, when used with the original mathematic formula, allows the encrypted information to be read. Key length is measured in "bits" with bit lengths beginning at 40 bits, 56 bits, and 64 bits. An example of a key would be an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) personal identification number. The longer the key (i.e., the more numbers involved), the stronger the security. Each number added to the key increases the number of possible combinations which, in GW Policy Perspectives 1997 When data is encrypted, it is important that the program be secure for a long time. Ian Goldberg, a graduate computer science student at the University of California, Berkeley, claimed, "It [the key] is no good if today it can't be broken but two months from now it can." 16 A panel of cryptography experts pointed out that in order to ensure that there is "adequate protection against serious threats," a minimum of 75 bits is necessary for protection and 90 bits would be ideal for protection from hacking for the next 20 years. 17 The issue of key length has featured significantly in the recent debate over cryptography policy. Goldberg responded to a challenge by RSA Data Security Inc. to break a 40-bit key and access encrypted information. Using a network of 100 workstations at the University of California, Berkeley, Goldberg was able to crack a 40-bit code in three and one-half hours. Goldberg was able to test over 100 billion keys an hour and used over 1 trillion possible keys to break the code. 18 Correctly designed cryptography not only assures the confidentiality of documents, but also affords authentica-tion capability through the use of "digital signatures." A digital signature is "a cryptographic-based assurance that a particular file or message was created or transmitted by a given person." 19 Cryptography also allows for the ability to authenticate the integrity of transmitted data and verification of the sender of the data, much as a handwritten signature verifies the authenticity of a paper transaction. Another benefit of digital signatures is that of nonrepudiation, which provides evidence that an authentic transaction took place. For example, if a customer places an order through the Internet, the customer's digital signature would be absolute proof that the order was placed. The growth in communications applications such as electronic mail and electronic fund transfers rely upon the authentication and confidentiality of encryption technology.
Cryptography can provide the confidentiality that is necessary for preventing crimes in legitimate business and personal transactions, such as the unauthorized interception of private electronic mail and the unauthorized disclosure of medical data. However, this confidentiality can also be used for illegitimate purposes. The National Research Council points out that "Although strong, automatic encryption implemented as an integral part of data processing and communication provides confidentiality for the software industry and civil libertarians on one side and the Clinton administration and law enforcement agencies on the other.
The advent of the computer revolution has created a growing market for cryptography technology. Cryptography had long been reserved for protecting the confidentiality of military and diplomatic documents, but the increased use of the Internet for commerce and communication has increased demand for cryptography by business interests and private citizens. This demand goes beyond the borders of the United States, moreover, with foreign entities entering the competitive market. Customers around the world are seeking the technology that will ensure that their Internet transactions are secure. Not surprisingly, the global demand for cryptography has precipitated a contentious debate in the United States over cryptography policy.
The Policy of Export Control
Since foreign interests and criminal elements could easily invade American networks and evade law enforcement if they possess the right code-breaking technology, the United States has prohibited the export of cryptography and related technical data out of fear that this technology will fall into the wrong hands. 22 By contrast, no controls are 'good guys' against 'bad guys' (e.g., U.S. business protecting information against economic intelligence efforts of foreign nations), it unfortunately also protects 'bad guys' against 'good guys' (e.g., terrorists evading law enforcement agencies 33 The EAA provides the legislative basis for the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which establish dualuse items (having both military and civilian applications) that are then placed on the Commerce Control List (CCL).27 The CCL is administered by the Commerce Department and is reviewed only once by the U.S. government in order to simplify the marketing and sale of a product overseas. 28 Products on the Commerce Control List receive a more liberal export consideration than items on the United States Munitions List. The National Security Agency reviews encryption products and gives its opinion on whether the product should be placed on the more restrictive munitions list or the more liberal Commerce Control List.
Under the authority of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, all "cryptographic systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems" are subject to review for placement on the munitions liSt. 29 However, certain exemptions related to bit length of the key were made for cryptography to be regulated as a dualuse item and placed on the Commerce Control List. Still, the software industry is only allowed to export items with 40-bit keys.3D
Law enforcement and national security concerns have greatly influenced export control policy. Law enforcement agencies fear that their ability to conduct investigations GW Policy Perspectives 1997 largely irrelevant to issues of military security and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to law enforcement agencies."n Paradoxically, strict export controls have hindered the availability of effective security measures in this country. For example, the global nature of the Internet requires the "interoperability" of computer systems, that is a United States system has to be able to communicate with a European system. If these interoperative systems are using cryptograph>" both users must encrypt and authenticate information using the same cryptographic formula. However, if users of the European systems are unable to decrypt messages sent from American users because U.S. encryption technology is restricted in Europe, the interoperability of the global system is defeated, To remedy this problem, U.S. software companies produce products with relatively weak cryptography-key lengths of 40 bits and below-that will pass the export restriction. These products thereby lower the overall strength of cryptography in this country. Thus, export controls tend to drive major vendors to a "least common denominator" cryptographic solution that will pass export review as well as sell in the United States. 33 The United States software industry, tlle worldwide leader in the development of computer programming, has bristled under the export controls. One concern is the potential loss of market shares overseas for United States companies. A recent report prepared by the Commerce Department and the National Security Agency entitled "A Study of the International Market for Computer Software With Encryption" pointed out that U.S. companies will lose market share in the international cryptography market to foreign encryption products. The Computer Systems Policy Project has estimated that unless the export controls are lifted, Uthe U.S. technology industry will lose $60 billion in revenues and 200,000 jobs by the year 2000."34 The GAO has also alluded to the weakness of the export control policy in noting that "a German company contracts with a Japanese company to manufacture a highspeed encryption chip for export to Germany. In contrast, U.S. export controls prevent U.s. companies from exporting such a chip to the German company." 35 Export controls also put U.S. companies that do business with foreign-based companies or have branches based outside the country at a disadvantage since U.S. companies are unable to securely and easily engage in electronic commerce.
A cryptography policy of export control is no longer politically viable in the United States. Five bills recently introduced in Congress testify to congressional realization of the limitations of the export control policy. The Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era Act (ProCqde), proposed by Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT), would have abolished controls on encryption and would have prohibited the federal government from both restricting the sale of encryption and attaching conditions to any sale.
Support for the policy of export control is practically nonexistent outside of the law enforcement advocates within the Clinton administration. A large number of constituent groups, ranging from software industry representatives to civil liberties groups, lobbied against the export control policy. As IBM points out, uFor the first time, government, industry, consumer groups, civil liberties groups, and the media around the world appear to agree it is time to reform public policy on cryptography."36 The Administration appeared to acknowledge these concerns on October 1, 1996, when the president proposed a plan to relax the export controls but with restrictions.
Developing a Balanced Approach to Evaluating Cryptography Policy
A major criticism that the National Research Council directs at the current policy is, "For many years, concern over foreign threats to national security has been the 48 primary driver of a national cryptography policy."37 Designing a new approach to United States cryptography policy must synthesize many interests, including law enforcement and national security concerns, global economic competitiveness, and individual privacy:.
Information SecuritJj
Information security interests take into consideration whether or not a proposal maintains or increases the level of security available through on-line communications and data storage. Concerns over interoperability have created a "lowest common denominator" effect that has watered down the strength of cryptographic technology. But any new policy that results in decreased information security would be ineffective. Proposals in cryptography should therefore offer a step forward in advancing the strength of information security. this policy only applies to stand-alone, security-specific cryptography products. However, the largest market is for integrated products in which a primary program is integrated with encryption capabilities such as e-mail programs and Web browsers.
The Netscape Navigator, the leading Web browser on the market, is such a product. The browser can be obtained in two ways: it can be downloaded over the Internet or bought in the store. Not surprisingly, downloading the Navigator is more convenient. What is not evident is that in order to market the browser over the Internet, the lowest possible encryption is loaded into the program. The shrinkwrapped version, on the other hand, includes the highest possible encryption. As a result, the strength of information security capabilities in the downloaded version-the most widely-used by the American public because of its convenience--is in question. 
Global Economic Competitiveness
For the past 25 years, the United States has led the way in developing computer and communications technology. In fact, the U.S. digital industry is a $1.5 trillion industry. 38 The global growth in the use of information technologies has caused an increased demand for cryptography. But, as already mentioned, export controls of cryptography threaten the American leadership in computer technology.
Cryptography policy needs to elevate the economic competitiveness of the software industry. However, concerns of economic competitiveness extend beyond that of just the software industry. The economic opportunities of all U.S. companies operating in the global marketplace would be supported by the ability to use cryptography for their international business activities. 
Privacy

Law Enforcement/National Security
National security and law enforcement concerns are the impetus for the creation of cryptography policy. Any proposal to change U.S. policy must allow communications and stored information of foreign entities hostile to the United States and criminal elements to be made available to law enforcement and national security agencies as necessary.
The National Research Council voices another consideration regarding national security and the policy of export controls in pointing out, "export controls on products with encryption capabilities may well have a negative impact on U.S. national security interests by stimulating the growth of important foreign competitors over which the U.S. government had less influence and possibly by damaging U.s. competitive advantage in the use and development of information technology."44 The United States is a leader in creating information technology standards throughout the world. By changing the current policy, the United States government would still have a major hand in how cryptography policy is developed on the international stage. If United States cryptography policy is not changed, on the other hand, the United States government could lose its global leadership in assuring the security of the Internet.
Political Viability
Any change in United States cryptography policy must meet the concerns of both the Clinton administration and the Republican-controlled Congress. The Clinton administration has been unwilling to stray from the concerns expressed by the National Security Agency, the primary goal of which seems to be keeping cryptographic codebreakers out of the hands of criminals and foreign terrorists.
Meanwhile, Congress has expressed considerable interest in this topic, as evidenced by the recent hearings held on the issue and the number of bills introduced. In the 105th Congress, Senator Conrad Bums (R-MT) introduced in the Senate the Promotion of Commerce On-line in the Digital Era Act or Pro-Code (S. 1726) which aims to overturn the Clinton administration export controls. In the House, Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R·Va) introduced the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act in the 104th Congress and has said that he will do so again in the 105th Congress. Both bills generated bipartisan support, but were unable to reach the floor of either the House or Senate. A growing number of Republicans in Congress fault Administration efforts to link export controls to key escrow proposals and criticizes the Administration for failing, "lo recognize that top-down government-imposed policies are doomed to defeat."4!!
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Approaches to Cryptography Policy: The Alternatives While there are varied approaches toward United States cryptography policy reform, three major alternatives exist. The first alternative is the elimination of all export controls and complete free trade of encryption, which is strongly advocated by civil liberties groups and a group of advocates in the software industry. The second alternative is the new Clinton administration policy which went into effect on January I, 1997, and which seeks to loosen export . restrictions but ties this loosening to several conditions. The third alternative, which is advocated by such groups as the National Research Council and growing numbers in the software industry, proposes the relaxation-but not the complete elimination-of export controls through the use of a modified "key escrow" system.
Elimination of All Export Controls
The total elimination of export controls is supported by a diverse group that ranges from Internet advocates like the Internet Architecture Board and Internet Engineering Steering Group, to civil liberties organizations like the Electronic Privacy Information Center and the Center for Democracy and Technology. Advocates for this alternative gained congressional support when Senator Burns introduced his Pro-Code bill. Senator Bums' bill would have authorized the export of computer software with encryption for nonmilitary use to any country in which such software is permitted, unless "there is substantial evidence that such software will be diverted to a military end-use or an end-use supporting international terrorism. "46 Eliminating export controls completely would likely have the effect of improving the level of security in digital communications. The "least common denominator" effect-whereby the U.S. software industry has created bare minimum cryptography for domestic use and that stays off the munitions list-is likely to disappear with the absence of controls. u.s. software companies would be able to concentrate on developing stronger cryptography, without having to worry about exceeding the weak 40-bit key length threshold. Since the strength of cryptography would certainly increase with the elimination of export controls, this policy would improve the level of security for computer transmitted information.
The economic competitiveness of the U.S. software industry is also likely to be strengthened by the elimination of export controls. As However, the policy of eliminating all controls fails to acknowledge the arguments made by law enforcement and national security agencies. Representatives from the FBI and the National Security Agency have repeatedly said that, "unregulated encryption will only increase the chance of international communication and the threat of terrorism."4,'l Although law enforcement may be willing to endorse a softer line regarding export restrictions, their condition would be access to encrypted information that may be used illegally. Eliminating all controls clearly does not adequately address national security concerns.
Eliminating export controls also lacks political Viability. Senator Burns' bill, which would have implemented this policy alternative, failed to pass through committee. Burns has recently introduced legislation that would eliminate exports controls in the 105th Congress. While there does appear to be a growing sentiment on Capitol Hill that cryptography policy should be changed, there are few signs that the changes would involve the complete elimination of export controls. The Clinton administration is unlikely to endorse this policy as well. Administration
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cryptographic policy alternatives that include a key escrow system.
Key escrow involves giving the encryption key to a neutral third party that stores the key. Should law enforcement agencies have reason to decrypt encrypted messages, the agencies would have to obtain a court order for the third party to release the key to give law enforcement access to the information. The concept of key escrow can be compared to a homeowner giving a trusted neighbor a copy of the keys to his home in case the homeowner is inadvertently locked out of his home. As with a thirdparty key escrow system, however, there are vulnerabilities within this scenario to which critics point as major drawbacks.
Drawing again upon the homeowner's scenario: While the neighbor may be trustworthy, other people, including members of the neighbor's family, may acquire access to the key which would be unacceptable to the homeowner. Through this kind of vulnerability, giving the key to a third party, the privacy of encrypted information is now exposed.
Law enforcement agencies strongly contend some type of back door is needed, whereby encrypted information can be accessed if necessary. But, organizations such as the Center for Democracy and Technology (COT), a nonprofit organization that advocates new computer and communications technologies that advance constitutional civil Uberties, claim that such a back door (key escrow) violates our right to privacy since it mandates giving the key to private information to a third party."l1
The software industry appears to be leaning toward the kind of restriction maintained by II key escrow system. 
Clinton Administration Proposal-Strict Key Escrow
The Clinton administration backed away from its previous policy of tight export controls in rules proposed in October 1996 and put into effect on January I, 1997. 54 The Administration acknowledged the concerns expressed by the technology industry and sought to liberalize the policy of export controls on cryptography. In outlining the philosophy behind the Administration's new proposal, Vice President Al Gore stated, "President Clinton and I are committed to promoting the growth of electronic commerce and robust, secure communications worldwide while protecting the public safety and national security."ss According to preliminary rules released by the Commerce Department in December 1996, this policy would lift export restrictions on 56-bit key length encryption technology after a general, one-time licensing review was conducted to determine if the restriction on an encryption product could be lifted. Parties who apply for licensing under this program would be compelled to release their keys to escrow within two years. Within the two-year time frame, the exporter of cryptography must submit detailed business and marketing plans to the Commerce Department's Bureau Of Export Administration every six months in order to have the export license renewed. 56 The lifting of the restriction would also be contingent on an agreement to give the keys to a third party, hence a key escrow system. This key escrow proposal would establish a third party, selected by the government, that would store the keys and law enforcement officials, under the author- 52 ity of a court order, could access the key to unlock encrypted documents. 57 However, domestic use of key escrow would be voluntary as the Administration keeps to the policy of not mandating the regulation of domestic cryptography. 58 The software industry won further concessions when President Clinton, through Executive Order, moved cryptography off the State Department Munitions Control List and onto the "dual-use" Commerce Control List. 59 Moving cryptography to the discretion of the Commerce Department is a departure from the previous policy of tying cryptography to International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Nevertheless, this strict key escrow policy addresses the concerns of law enforcement and national security. While the export controls are loosened somewhat, law enforcement agencies are still allowed the minimum "backdoor" reqUirement whereby they would still have legal access to encrypted information.
Other concerns such as economic competitiveness need to be considered when allowing for the export of encryption technology. The overall policy which was put into effect by the Clinton administration, while straying from the stringent export controls, offers some "strings attached" policy in which licensing of trade is tied to the willingness of companies to comply with the Administration proposal.
At the same time, however, this form of cryptography policy is an improvement over the export control policy which watered down the strength of U.S. cryptography. However, the 56-bit limit still does not provide the strongest cryptography available. The Business Software Alliance (BSA), a trade group representing the software industry, had been lobbying for an adjustment to the 56-bit limit every two to three years to adjust to the increased sophistication of hacking techniques. 60 These concerns were not addressed in the new policy.
The success of this policy alternative in improving economic competitiveness depends upon the willingness of foreign companies to use key escrow cryptography. If non-key escrow cryptography is available to these companies, there is no reason to expect the companies to acquiesce to the demands of the United States government. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) points out, "Conditioning foreign sales of products with DES [56-bit keys] on development of key recovery systems puts enormous pressure on our computer industry to move forward with key escrow whether their customers want it or not.// 61 At this time, there is no evidence to show that foreign companies will accept the strict key escrow policy.
There are privacy concerns involved with this policy, particularly about upholding the constitutional protection of privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures. The policy is troublesome because it makes information security contingent upon the fidelity of three actors-the sender, receiver and hey holder of encrypted information-while previous policy needed the trustworthiness of only two actors, the sender and the receiver. At issue is the government control of third party selection. As Jim Bidzos suggests, when the government shows up at someone's door armed with a search warrant, a citizen will let them in. There is no need to make up keys to your home and give them to the government in advance. He claims that this is essentially what the government is asking the software industry to do. 62 More specifics are needed in order to ensure that questions regarding unlawful access of information by third parties is addressed. What is promising about the proposal is that should law enforcement need to decrypt encrypted information, law enforcement must first obtain a proper court order. Despite the assurances that proper due process will be followed by law enforcement in the access of keys, the ambiguity of the current policy over who controls the keys keeps this proposal controversial.
The software industry, while concluding that some form of key escrow is inevitable, has opposed the new policy. BSA has vowed to lobby against the new rules set forth by the Clinton Administration. Becca Gould, vice president for public policy at the BSA said, "We call it unworkable. We think these regulations should be thrown out in their entirety.//63 The BSA believes that key escrow should be market driven and voluntary and that there should be an unlimited key length allowed for key recovery products. 64 Political viability of the new strict key escrow system is questionable. With the 105th Congress yet to address the issue, the popularity, or lack thereof, on Capitol Hill of this new proposal is ambiguous. However, Senators Patrick Leahy and Conrad Burns have come out in opposition to this new "strings attached" policy alternative. Senator Burns pointed out that the Administration policy "raises more questions than it answers."65 Burns was troubled by the fact that Congress was not involved in developing the new policy-Clinton, using the power of Executive Order, went around Congress to establish the new policy-and said, "I can't say I'm pleased with a process that has all but excluded Congress and the public from the discussion."66 Burns, who failed to pass his bill in the 104th Congress to do away with any export restrictions, has reintroduced such legislation in the 105th Congress.
The new Clinton administration policy is proposed to be in effect for two years, at which time it can be re-evaluated or changed. With two prominent senators, one from each side of the aisle, questioning the new Administration policy, the strict key escrow policy alternative stands on unstable ground. The Clinton administration's proposed changes to cryptography policy does not go far enough to address concerns over privacy and economic competitiveness. Perhaps most important, the Administration's insistence that the United States government control the key escrow system keeps this policy from becoming a viable option in reforming cryptography policy.
The Modified Key Escrow System -A Compromise Approach
In order to bring about a broader consensus on the cryptography policy problem, Congress, in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, called upon the National Research Council (NRC) to "conduct a comprehensive study of cryptographic technologies and national cryptographic policy," and to assess the "effect of cryptographic technologies on national security and law enforcement interests of the Unites States citizens; and the effect on commercial interests of the United States industry of export controls on cryptographic technologies."67 The NRC gathered a well-rounded group of 20 experts in the field who concluded that U.S. policy should be changed and that "current national cryptographiC policy is not adequate to support the information security requirements of an information society."68
In the report, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society, the NRC put forward a comprehensive policy that balanced the national security and law enforcement needs with other concerns, mainly global economic.competitiveness and privacy. Major recommendations included: (1) a policy that does not limit or regulate the use of domestic encryption; (2) making national policy more closely aligned with market forces; (3) export controls should be relaxed but not eliminated; and (4) the new policy should assist law enforcement and national security in adjusting to the new technical age. 69 The NRC report provides a valuable groundwork for establishing a policy that can bring together the seemingly disparate concerns of national security, privacy, and economic competitiveness. However, the NRC does not endorse a key recovery system. To hasten a consensus, it may be time to put the key escrow system on the table as the best approach toward compromise, but the keys should be kept in control of the software companies filtil mandated to be released to the government by court order.
Security issues fare better under this software industry as well as other businesses which seek to use the Internet to conduct global business.
Civil liberties critics have problems with the modified key escrow proposal. These critics believe that this system would involve prior restraint and infringe upon Fourth Amendment protections. However, the basic right to privacy is not violated as law enforcement agencies will have to follow due process in order to gain access to keys to decrypt information. This policy differs from the new Administration proposal in that the keys would not be held by a third party, government entity. Instead, the keys would be held by the software companies who would release them upon court order. A unique proposal made in the NRC report is that the federal modified key escrow policy than under the Clinton administration policy. The proposal calls for 56-bit key length cryptography to be easily exportable and available. Also, products that provide stronger protection would be made available to a list of approved companies, foreign subsidiaries, and approved foreign interests if these companies were willing to provide access to the encrypted information
Relaxing the export controls through a key-escrow system
controlled by the software government begin to use key escrow encryption in order to calm the concerns of critics and to study, first hand, any difficulties that would arise from using a key escrow cryptography. 73 
companies offers a balanced policy that weighs concerns about
Law enforcement concerns are effectively addressed by this policy, and they are synthesized with the concerns of businesses and individuals. A national security, economic competitiveness, and individual privacy.
''backdoor'' is still available through the modified key escrow approach. Also, the creation of a list of approved when legally called upon.7°
Non-government use of cryptography is inevitable, and U.S. policy should facilitate this transition. The NRC points out, "National cryptography policy has become increasingly disconnected from market reality and the needs of parties in the private sector."7l The proposed relaxation of the export control and the use of a list of approved companies who are allowed to import American cryptography will help establish the U.S. technology industry as an important actor in the trade of technology. Non-computer related industries, as well as their foreign subsidiaries and trading partners, will benefit from the strongest cryptography available, provided that they are on the approved list of commercial users. This is a positive result because, as Irving Wladawsky-Berger of IBM notes, "Once businesses are confident that their electronic transactions are safe ... a flood of new market opportunities will open." 72 The relaxation of the export restriction and the creation of the approved commercial users list will aid in increasing the economic competitiveness of the U.S.
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companies will compel these companies to follow the letter of the law in order to remain on the list. The NRC calls for Congress to consider legislation that would create criminal penalties if encrypted communications is used with the intent to commit a federal crime. 74 The modified key escrow approach is by far the best proposal put forward that balances law enforcement and business concerns.
Congress seems more receptive to this modified key escrow system. Senator Burns criticized the new Clinton proposal as incongruent with the NRC report, but the differences are not that dramatic,75 Therefore, it appears that a compromise will need to be reached. The NRC report offers the greatest amount of common ground. Therefore, the proposals of the NRC report, while not immediately enacted by the Clinton administration, should be incorporated in a compromise with Congress as a politically viable alternative.
Based upon the analysis of these three leading proposalselimination of all export controls, strict key escrow, and modified key escrow-the modified key escrow system is clearly the best alternative for reforming U.S. cryptography policy. Of all of the proposals, the modified key escrow approach best addresses the concern that export controls have weakened cryptography abroad and hindered the availability of strong encryption technology in this country as welL The current U.S. policy does not adequately balance all of the interests involved in the cryptography debate. In the modified key escrow proposal, however, all sides of the debate are considered. More importantly, this policy appears to be more amenable to the international community. Relaxing the export controls through a keyescrow system controlled by the software companies offers a balanced policy that weighs concerns about national secu- 
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and a growing number of legislators questioning the plan, the policy is on unstable ground. Cryptography policy is trapped in the mentality of protecting United States national security interests and the concerns of federal and local law enforcement. But, developing cryptography policy for the future of the global Internet necessitates a change of philosophy. Future cryptographic policy analysis must continue to progress beyond national security issues and consider the concerns of businesses and private citizens' as they adjust to the ever-expanding Information Age. reaffirmed NIST as the responsible federal agency for developing federal cryptographic information-processing standards for the security of sensitive, unclassified information. However, NIST has followed NSA's lead when developing certain cryptographic standards for communications privacy."
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